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Abstract: Over the past two decades, the study of model-based dependability analysis has 
gathered significant research interest. Different approaches have been developed to automate 
and address various limitations of classical dependability techniques to contend with the 
increasing complexity and challenges of modern safety-critical system. Two leading 
paradigms have emerged, one which constructs predictive system failure models from 
component failure models compositionally using the topology of the system. The other 
utilizes design models - typically state automata - to explore system behaviour through fault 
injection. This paper reviews a number of prominent techniques under these two paradigms, 
and provides an insight into their working mechanism, applicability, strengths and challenges, 
as well as recent developments within these fields.  We also discuss the emerging trends on 
integrated approaches and advanced analysis capabilities. Lastly, we outline the future 
outlook for model-based dependability analysis. 
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1 Introduction  
Integrated and effective dependability analysis has become increasingly important as modern 
safety-critical systems become more heterogeneous and complex. Dependability can be 
defined as the “the ability of an entity to perform one or several required functions under 
given condition” (Villemeur, 1991). The study of system dependability covers four properties 
safety, reliability, availability, and maintainability. Safety is the ability of the system to avoid 
causing hazards for people and the environment.   Reliability is the ability of the system to 
perform its intended functions satisfactorily for a given time interval. Availability studies the 
readiness of the system to perform its function at a given instance of time. And 
maintainability is the ability of the system to be maintained or restored to a state in which it 
can perform its function, when maintenance is performed as specified.  In this paper, 
emphasis is placed on safety and reliability due to the context of safety-critical systems in 
which many of the techniques are situated. However, references are made to work within 
these techniques to address availability and maintainability, e.g. as in (Papadopoulos, 
Nggada, & Parker, 2010). The integration between analysis techniques and advanced system 
engineering and modelling is also beneficial for the functionality, accessibility, and usability 
dimensions of the system development.  
Dependability  assessment should  begin  early  in  the  design  phase  so  that potential  
problems  can  be  identified  and rectified  early  to  avoid  expensive  changes  in the later 
phase of the  system lifecycle. Traditional dependability analysis techniques like fault tree 
analysis (FTA) (Vesely, Dugan, Fragola, Minarick, & Railsback, 2002) and Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) (US Department of Defense, 1980) are well-established and 
widely used during the design phase of safety-critical systems. FTA is a deductive analysis 
technique which utilizes graphical representation based on Boolean logic to show logical 
connections between different failures and their causes. FMEA is an inductive technique 
which tries to infer the unknown effects on the system of known component failure modes.  
 These techniques are typically applied manually and often performed on an informal system 
model which may rapidly become out of date as the system design evolves. This presents 
challenges in maintaining the consistency and completeness of the assessment process.  
Over the past 20 years, new developments in the field of dependability engineering have led 
to a body of work on model-based assessment and prediction of dependability. Model-based 
techniques offer significant advantages over traditional approaches as they utilise software 
automation and integration with design models to simplify the synthesis and analysis of 
complex safety-critical systems. These techniques can be applied from early stages of 
expressing requirements and until detailed architectural design.  
Emerging model-based dependability analysis (MBDA) techniques can be conceptualized 
and classified according to different criteria. In (Aizpurua & Muxika, 2012), classification 
criteria include the type of traditional limitations overcome by new techniques, recovery 
strategies, and the approach to design verification. Classical FTA and FMEA are static in 
nature and do not take into consideration the time or sequence dependencies. They are also 
traditionally manual processes which rely heavily on the analysts' skills and are susceptible to 
human errors. Certain MBDA techniques have been developed to address the temporal and 
dynamic limitations, while other techniques focus on making the analysis process more 
manageable. Different techniques may also employ different recovery strategies, including 
heterogeneous redundancies, homogeneous redundancies, shared redundancies, graceful 
degradation, and implicit redundancies. Techniques have also been classified based on the 
type of design verification, i.e. whether it is based on fault injection or an integrative 
approach. In (Lisagor, Kelly, & Niu, 2011), MBDA are categorized based on the model 
provenance and the engineering semantics of the component interfaces. Model provenance 
categorizes techniques based on the construction of safety model and its relationship with the 
system design. Safety analysis models can be defined either through extension to the design 
model, or as a dedicated model defined by safety engineers. Regarding the engineering 
semantics of components, categorization is possible with respect to the type of modelling of 
component dependencies. These dependencies can be captured in terms of either deviations 
from design intent, or abstracted nominal flow (for example energy, matter and information).  
The classification of MBDA techniques in this paper is based on the general underlying 
formalism and the types of analysis performed. Based on this, model-based techniques 
typically gravitate towards two leading paradigms. The first paradigm, termed Failure Logic 
Synthesis and Analysis (FLSA), focuses on the automatic construction of predictive system 
failure analyses, such as fault trees or FMEAs, on the basis of information stored in the 
system model. These approaches are typically compositional, where the system-level models 
of failure propagation can be generated from component-level failure logic and the overall 
topology of the system. This compositionality lends itself well to automation and reuse of 
component failure models across applications, and this is beneficial to dependability analysis 
in ways similar to those introduced by reuse of trusted software components in software 
engineering. Techniques which follow this approach include Hierarchically Performed 
Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS), Component Fault Trees (CFT), State-
Event Fault Trees (SEFT), and the Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation and 
Calculus (FPTN and FPTC). 
The second paradigm, termed Behavioural Fault Simulation (BFS), automatically analyses 
potential failures in a system and the development has led to a group of formal verification 
based techniques. These generally work by injecting possible faults into simulations based on 
executable, formal specifications of a system and studying the effects of those faults on the 
system behaviour. The results are then used by model checking tools to verify whether 
system dependability requirements are being satisfied or whether violations of the 
requirements exist in normal or faulty conditions. Techniques in this category include 
AltaRica, The Formal Safety Analysis Platform/New Symbolic Model Verifier (FSAP-
NuSMV), Safety Analysis Modelling Language (SAML), and Deductive Cause Consequence 
Analysis (DCCA).  
Much of this recent work on dependability analysis has a natural synergy with a wider trend 
towards model-based design, particularly domain-specific languages. In many industries, 
particularly transport and aerospace, designers are increasingly adopting Architecture 
Description Languages (ADLs) to encapsulate both architectural and behavioural information 
about the system. Such ADLs may not only represent the system itself, but also the functional 
and non-functional requirements and properties of the system; they may also provide 
facilities for the refinement of the system throughout the design lifecycle, showing how the 
requirements are being met at each stage. One key aspect of such ADLs is to represent the 
safety requirements and the failure logic of the system, and these areas have often seen 
integration with model-based dependability analysis techniques. For instance, recent work 
has demonstrated that dependability analysis of automotive EAST-ADL models is possible 
via HiP-HOPS while dependability analysis of aerospace AADL error models is possible via 
conversion to classical artefacts e.g. combinatorial  and temporal fault trees or Generalised 
Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs). The integration of the comprehensive behavioural and 
architectural data offered by ADLs with model-based analysis engines also makes new forms 
of analysis possible. This has subsequently led to techniques that allow automatic 
optimisation of system attributes — such as dependability, cost, and performance — by 
means of meta-heuristics that can efficiently explore the huge design spaces involved.  
This work complements previous much less detailed discussions on classification and 
overview of model-based analysis techniques presented in (Lisagor, Kelly, & Niu, 2011)  and 
(Aizpurua & Muxika, 2013). We extensively explore various prominent techniques and study 
their recent updates and developments. The aim of this paper is not to define strict 
classification of techniques, but to review the state-of-the-art in this field, explaining the 
fundamental concepts involved and comparing the key techniques that have been developed 
in terms of their features, achievements, applicability, and scalability. We also discuss the 
current challenges faced by these techniques, including representativeness and completeness 
of models, modelling and analysis structure, the scalability of models and analyses, and 
obstacles in practicability and uptake of this work. We conclude with a discussion on the 
future outlook of this work, looking at how these challenges may be addressed and how 
research is already being developed to address new problems, including separation of 
hardware/software concerns in embedded systems, and efficient multi-objective optimisation 
of different system attributes.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as the following: Section 2 discusses a number of 
prominent FLSA techniques. Section 3 discusses a number of techniques employing 
Behavioural Fault Simulation. As techniques mature, further development tends to blur the 
lines of categorization, and techniques often extend into a hybrid or integrated approach. 
Section 4 studies a number of emerging integrated techniques and challenges, while Section 5 
concludes and outlines future outlook.  
2 Failure Logic Synthesis and Analysis 
In FLSA, system failure models are constructed from component failure models using a 
process of composition. System failure models typically comprise, or can be automatically 
converted into, well-known dependability evaluation models such as fault trees, stochastic 
Petri-nets and Markov chains. These types of techniques therefore model the deviation from 
the design intent rather than nominal (normal) behaviour of the system.  
Techniques based on FLSA include the Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation 
(FPTN), Failure Propagation and Transformation Calculus (FPTC), Hazard Origin and 
Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS), Component Fault Trees (CFT), and State-Event Fault 
Trees (SEFT). Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) are widely adopted in the recent 
years to support the integration between analysis models in FLSA and system design models 
expressed in the language. An introduction to an ADL called Architecture Analysis and 
Design Language (AADL) is therefore included in this section.  
2.1 Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN) 
Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN) (Fenelon & McDermid, 1993) is 
among the pioneering MBDA methods designed to address limitations of FTA and FMEA in 
specifying system failure behaviour. It was developed as part of the Software Safety 
Assessment Procedures (SSAP) project.  It uses a modular, hierarchical notation to describe 
the propagation of faults through the modules of system architecture. FPTN module is 
represented as a box with a set of inputs and outputs, which can be connected to other 
modules. To form a hierarchical structure, each module can contain a number of sub-
modules. Failures can be propagated or transformed from one type to another. The relation 
between the inputs and outputs is expressed by a set of logical equations equivalent to the 
minimal cutsets (smallest and necessary combination of failures which cause a higher-level 
fault) of the fault trees describing the output failure modes of the module. Therefore, each 
module represents a number of fault trees describing all the failure modes for that module. 
These equations can also contain more advanced constructs, allowing FPTN to represent 
recovery mechanisms and internal failure modes. This type of notation enables FPTN to be 
used both inductively (to create an FMECA) and deductively (to create an FTA). 
FPTN is designed to be developed alongside the design of the system. Information collected 
can then be used to identify potential flaws and problems in the system design so that they 
can be eliminated or compensated for in the next design iteration. In its classical form, FPTN 
is limited to static analysis, but recent work on Temporal-FPTN (Niu, Tang, Lisagor, & 
McDermid, 2011) extended FPTN with temporal information to allow dynamic analysis by 
using Failure Temporal Logic to specify failure relationship, and produces Minimal Cutset 
Sequences. However, although FPTN provides a systematic and formal notation for 
representing the failure behaviour of a system (a distinct improvement on traditional ad hoc 
approaches), it lacks full automation, and the fact that each analysis must be conducted 
manually hampers the opportunity for it to be used in an iterative design process.  
2.2 Failure Propagation & Transformation Calculus 
Failure Propagation & Transformation Calculus (FPTC) (Paige, Rose, Ge, Kolovos, & 
Brooke, 2008) is a method for the representation and analysis of the failure behaviour of the 
software and hardware components of a system. It allows annotation of an architectural 
model of a system with concise expressions describing how each component can fail; these 
annotations can then be used to compute the failure properties of the whole system 
automatically. 
FPTC is primarily designed for real-time software systems where a statistically schedulable 
code unit is considered as the primary unit of the architectural description. The data and 
control flow behaviour of the system is defined by connecting these units using 
communications protocols like handshakes and buffers. FPTC assumes that all the threads 
and communications are known in advance and are not created or destroyed dynamically 
during the system operation. FPTC also offers the capability to describe the allocation of 
these units and their communications to different physical processing devices and networks. 
This makes it possible to describe how, for example, one faulty processor can affect all 
software units running on it. 
FPTC represents the system architecture using a RTN (Real-Time Network) style notation, 
consisting of a graph of arcs and nodes representing hardware and software units and the 
communications between them. Communications are typed according to protocol (e.g. 
blocking / non-blocking). RTN offers significant capabilities, including the ability to refine 
graphs hierarchically, to define code units as state machines, and to automatically generate 
Ada code from the design. An example RTN graph and associated key to some 
communications protocols are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 Example of FPTC Representation in RTN (Walker et al., 2008) 
Similar to FPTN, components may respond to failures in one of two ways: by propagating the 
failure or by transforming the failure. Components may also initiate or terminate failures, e.g. 
by failing silent or by detecting and correcting failures. These failures are typed similarly to 
FPTN e.g. timing, value, omission failures, but the types are not fixed and can be extended as 
required. 'Normal' is also a type, indicating the lack of a failure.  
The reaction to failure is described by a simple pattern-based notation. Once components are 
annotated with FPTC expressions, the resulting RTN graph can then be thought of as a token-
passing network in which failure tokens flow from one node to another, being created, 
transformed, and destroyed along the way. Each arc in the graph can then be further 
annotated with the set of possible failures that may propagate along it. This is done by 
'running' each expression in reaction to the 'normal' type and listing the resulting output 
failures on the output communication arcs; each component is then re-run in response to any 
new input failure types. The process terminates when no more new output failures are 
generated and all possible input/output combinations have been considered. 
One advantage of FPTC is the fact that it uses the full architectural models used for 
developing the software code and can adapt much more readily to changes . This helps ensure 
the FPTC model is synchronised with the design and offers significant advantage compared 
to FPTN which is annotated according to known failures, and so any new failure to be added 
requires the whole model to be manually reannotated. It also handles cycles in architectures 
by using fix-point calculations. There is also support for model transformation from AADL 
and SysML models through Epsilon (Paige, Rose, Ge, Kolovos, & Brooke, 2008). Recently, a 
probabilistic type known as Failure Propagation and Transformation Analysis (FPTA) is 
proposed in (Ge, Paige, & McDermid, 2009). This method links architectural models with 
probabilistic model checkers specified in PRISM and allows FPTC to capture non-
deterministic failure behaviour. FI
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FA (Gallina & Punnekkat, 2014)is the most recent 
extension of FPTC which allows FPTC to consider more types of failure behaviour e.g. 
incompletion, inconsistency, interference and impermanence and also analysis of mitigating 
behaviours. The primary disadvantage of FPTC is the necessity of performing a different 
analysis for each failure or combination of failures to be considered. Each originating failure 
must be specified at a component and then the model must be re-analysed to determine how 
this failure will propagate through the system and what failure modes will be communicated 
to critical components.  
2.3 Component Fault Tree 
Component Fault Trees (CFTs) (Kaiser, Liggesmeyer, & Mackel, 2003) is an extension to 
traditional fault trees which aims to provide better association between the hierarchy of faults 
and the architectural hierarchy of the system components. Although traditional fault tree 
allows modularization, it provides little information on the hierarchical decomposition of the 
physical system. CFTs define smaller fault trees for each component, thus incorporating the 
fault trees as part of the hierarchical component model of the system. Like traditional fault 
trees, CFTs use basic events, logical gates as well as input and output ports. The fact that 
CFTs are still logical structures linking output failures to input causes means that they can be 
analysed qualitatively and quantitatively using standard fault tree algorithms. 
CFTs differ from traditional fault trees in the sense that they allow multiple top events and by 
representing repeating (or common cause) failures only once. CFTs also form directed 
acyclic graphs called Cause Effect Graphs (CEGs), as illustrated in Figure 2, instead of 
traditional tree structure. The use of CEGs makes the CFTs smaller and easier to analyse, 
both significant benefits when modelling large systems. It also makes the diagrams clearer, as 
the fault tree nodes can be displayed as part of their components.  
 
Figure 2 Example of Component Fault Tree (Kaiser, Liggesmeyer, & Mackel, 2003) 
The main advantage of CFTs is its capability of hierarchical decomposition of systems to 
manage the complexity of modern systems. CFTs create smaller fault trees for each of the 
components and neatly capture the hierarchical system architecture. Consequently, different 
parts of the system can be developed and stored separately as part of the component 
definition in a library, and this facilitates greater degree of reusability. Conceptually, this 
hierarchical decomposition also makes it possible for the failure behaviour of the system to 
be modelled at different levels, e.g. for the top level subsystems first, and then once the 
design has been refined further, for the sub components as well. 
A windows-based tool, ESSaReL (ESSaRel, 2005) is available to perform minimal cut set 
analysis and probabilistic evaluation of CFTs. Recently another tool called ViSSaAn (Visual 
Support for Safety Analysis) (Yang, Zeckzer, Liggesmeyer, & Hagen, 2011) has been 
developed based on a matrix view to allow improved visualisation of CFTs and efficient 
representation of information related to minimal cut sets of CFTs. (Adler, et al., 2011) have 
developed a metamodel to extract reusable CFTs from the functional architecture of systems 
specified in UML.  
2.4 State-Event Fault Tree 
One of the limitation of FTA is its inability to adequately account for the temporal order of 
events, whether in terms of a simple sequence or a set of states and transitions. This limits the 
capability to analyse complex systems, particularly real-time embedded and software based 
systems. Fault trees are fundamentally a combinatorial technique and are not well suited to 
modelling the dynamic behaviour in such systems. State-Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) 
(Grunske, Kaiser, & Papadopoulos, 2005) are developed to address this limitation by 
combining elements from fault trees with Statecharts and Markov chains. This is done by 
adding states and events to fault trees, allowing the use of system state-based models as the 
basis for the analysis, as well as enabling the use of more sophisticated analysis methods (e.g. 
Markov chains). SEFTs can also be seen as an evolution of CFTs in that they allow 
decomposition and distribution across the components of the system, and represent inputs and 
outputs as visible ports in the model.  
SEFTs make a distinction between causal transition and sequential relation, and therefore 
provide corresponding separate types of ports. A sequential transition applies to states which 
specify a predecessor or successor relation between states, whereas a causal transition applies 
to events which define a causal (trigger/guard) relationship between events. Because events 
are explicitly represented (and do not always have to be state transitions), it is also possible 
for one event to cause another event. These events can also be combined using traditional 
fault tree gates (e.g. AND and OR) so that a combination of events is necessary to trigger 
another event. SEFTs also offer more advanced features for modelling timing scenarios. For 
example, events can be assigned deterministic or probabilistic delays by means of Delay 
Gates and SEFTs also allow the use of NOT gates. Sequential and causal modelling is further 
refined by means of History-AND and Priority-AND gates, which can check whether an 
event has occurred in the past and in what order it occurred, and other gates are also possible, 
e.g. Duration gates to ensure that a state has been active for a given amount of time. 
In SEFTs, a state is graphically represented as a rounded rectangle and considered as a 
condition that lasts over a period of time whereas an event is graphically represented as a 
solid bar and considered as an instantaneous phenomenon that can cause state transition. Each 
component has its own state space and each component can only be in one state at any point 
in time (the 'active state'). For the purposes of quantitative analysis, probabilities can be 
assigned to each state to reflect its chance of being the active state at any time. Similarly, 
events may be assigned probability densities for quantitative analysis. 
SEFTs follow the same general procedure as standard FTA in the modelling of system failure 
behaviour. Analysts begin with the occurrence of a system failure and trace it back through 
the components of the system to determine its root causes. SEFTs offer a greater level of 
detail during this analysis , e.g. by considering the effect of states in fault propagation. SEFTs 
also allow a greater degree of reuse than traditional fault trees because pre-existing state 
charts from the design can be used, as can Markov chains, which can be similarly integrated 
into the SEFTs. 
Unlike CFTs, SEFTs can no longer be analysed using traditional FTA algorithms. The 
inclusion of states and the different modelling of events means that different techniques are 
needed, such as the conversion to Petri Nets, to allow for the calculation of probabilities of 
system failures. Steiner, Keller, & Liggesmeyer (2012) have proposed a methodology to 
create and analyse SEFTs based on the ESSaRel tool (ESSaRel, 2005). SEFT models are 
converted to Deterministic Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) (Marsan & Chiola, 1987), then the 
analysis of the DSPN models can be performed using a DSPN analyser like TimeNET 
(German & Mitzlaff, 1995).  The conversion process requires the consideration of the entire 
system, which can lead to an explosion of state-spaces and thus performance problems for 
larger system models. This issue can be alleviated to some degree by using both 
combinatorial FTA-style algorithms and dynamic state-based algorithms to analyse different 
parts of the system, e.g. using the faster techniques for simple, static subsystems and using 
slower but more powerful techniques for the dynamic parts of the system. The effectiveness 
of this dual-analysis technique will depend heavily on the type of system being analysed. 
2.5 Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies 
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) (Papadopoulos 
& McDermid, 1999) is one of the pioneering MBDA techniques, and amongst the well-
supported advanced compositional safety analysis techniques. It provides a greater degree of 
automation compared to CFT or FPTN. HiP-HOPS also supports automatic optimisation of 
designs (Adachi, Papadopoulos, Sharvia, Parker, & Tohdo, 2011) (Papadopoulos, et al., 
2011) which can be employed for selection among alternatives for components and 
subsystems  as well for optimal decisions  on the level and location of replicated components. 
Recently HiP-HOPS has also been extended with capabilities for top-down automatic 
allocation of safety requirements in the form of Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). The latter  
automates some of the processes for Automotive SIL (ASIL) allocation as specified in the 
safety standard ISO26262. 
HiP-HOPS works in conjunction with commonly-used system modeling tools, for example 
Matlab Simulink or Simulation X. Failure editors are integrated into these modelling tools to 
allow system designers to annotate components with failure information. This failure 
information includes failure modes (internal malfunction) and output failure expressions, and 
describes how the component fails and its relationship with other component failures, i.e. 
whether and how the component responds or not to effects of failure received at the 
component  inputs. HiP-HOPS takes this information and examines how the component 
failures propagate through the system topology, producing sets of interrelated fault trees and 
eventually an FMEA. This approach also enables the hierarchical structure of the system to 
be captured neatly in the fault trees. There are three main phases in HiP-HOPS: model 
annotation, fault tree synthesis, and fault tree and FMEA analysis phase.  
The model annotation phase provides information to HiP-HOPS on how the component can 
fail. It takes the form of a set of expressions which are manually added. These local failure 
expressions describe how failures of the component outputs can be caused by a combination 
of failures received at the component's inputs and/or by internal malfunctions of the 
component itself. Common cause failures are also supported, as are failures propagated via 
other means, e.g. from allocated components. In this way it is possible to model more 
sophisticated scenarios — for instance, the effects on a software function, and consequently 
the software architecture, when the processor shown in the hardware architecture to be 
executing that function fails. 
The synthesis phase produces an interconnected network of fault trees which link system-
level failures (i.e., failures of the system's output functions) to component-level internal 
failures by using the model topology and component failure information. These fault trees 
show how component failures propagate from one component to another and how ultimately 
they may affect the wider system, whether individually or in combination with other 
component failures. 
In the analysis phase, the synthesized fault trees are analyzed via automated algorithms to 
generate minimal cut sets. Minimal cut sets describe the necessary and sufficient combination 
of events which lead to the undesired events. Eventually the data is combined into a multiple 
failure mode FMEA which shows both direct effects of failure modes on the system, as well 
as the further effects of the failure modes caused in conjunction with other failure modes 
occurring in the system. The resultant FMEA is presented in tables which are conveniently 
displayed through a web browser. These main phases of HiP-HOPS are illustrated in Figure 
3.  
 
Figure 3 Main Phases in HiP-HOPS 
Quantitative data can also be entered for the component to estimate the probability of internal 
failures occurring and the severity of output deviations. This data can then be used in the 
quantitative analysis phase to calculate the unavailability, i.e. failure probability, of the top 
event. HiP-HOPS assists reusability by enabling failure-annotated components to be stored in 
a library. This allows other components of a similar type to reuse failure data, and avoids the 
designer having to enter the same failure data multiple times. Recently, HiP-HOPS has also 
been extended with advanced features, including the capability to accommodate temporal 
analysis and perform multi-objective optimization.  
2.5.1 Temporal Analysis in HiP-HOPS using Pandora  
HiP-HOPS fundamentally inherits the static nature of FTA and this includes the lack of 
capability to capture time information or sequence-dependent behaviour. While the 
compositional failure model may be sufficient to describe the systems behaviour in many 
scenarios, it may not be adequate to describe the complete behaviour of complex systems. 
This drawback is particularly limiting in a system where functions and failure modes change 
according to different states.  In addition to this, the ability to understand and capture the 
order of failures can be important in producing an accurate failure model. Pandora (Walker, 
Bottaci, & Papadopoulos, 2007) was proposed to extend traditional fault trees with dynamic 
analysis capability by introducing new temporal gates and temporal logic. This technique can 
be used to obtain minimal cut sequences (the smallest necessary sequences of events to cause 
the top events) of temporal fault trees. Pandora is based around the redefinition of the long-
established Priority-AND (PAND)  (Fussel, Aber, & Rahl, 1976)  gate and aims to solve the 
ambiguities in the original PAND gate whilst maintaining the simplicity and flexibility of 
FTA. It allows the temporal ordering of events to be represented as part of the fault tree 
structure, and uses temporal logic gates Priority-AND (PAND), Priority-OR (POR), and 
Simultaneous-AND (SAND) to represent the temporal relations.  
Pandora provides better modelling for precise failure behaviour of dynamic systems than 
ordinary fault tree analysis. Because Pandora is designed to integrate with existing Boolean 
logic, it can be used in existing tools such as HiP-HOPS, extending it with additional 
dynamic FTA capabilities. The solution proposed by (Merle, Roussel, Lesage, & Bobbio, 
2010) is used as an analytical solution to Pandora’s PAND gate. Quantitative analysis of 
Pandora is recently discussed in (Edifor, Walker, & Gordon, 2012) and (Edifor, Walker, 
Gordon, & Papadopoulos, 2014) 
2.6 Architecture Analysis and Design Language 
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) (Feiler & Rugina, 2007) is a 
domain-specific language developed for the specification and analysis of hardware and 
software architectures of performance-critical real-time systems. AADL enables an array of 
modelling capabilities including structural description of the system as an assembly of 
software components mapped onto an execution platform, functional description of interfaces 
to components, and performance description of critical aspects of components. AADL allows 
both architectural modelling and error modelling. Architectural modelling describes the 
nominal architecture of the system, including the components, and their connections and 
interactions. Interactions show structural and behavioural aspects without considering the 
presence of faults. In contrast, error modelling captures the behaviour of components in the 
presence of internal faults, repair events, as well as external propagations of faults from other 
components.   
An AADL error model consists of a model type and, at least, one error model 
implementation. The form of error models is described in the AADL error model annex, 
which was intended to support the qualitative and quantitative analysis of dependability 
attributes.  The error model is a state machine that can be associated with an AADL element, 
i.e. component or connection, in order to describe its behaviour in terms of logical error states 
in the presence of faults. The error model can be associated with software (e.g. process, data, 
thread), hardware (e.g. processor, memory, device) and composite component (e.g. system) 
component and connection (Feiler, Gluch, & Hudak, 2006).  In AADL, systems may be 
represented as collections of components, hierarchies of components, or systems of systems. 
Therefore an AADL error model extends from system to subsystem to component, and the 
system error model is a composition of the error models of its subsystems or components. 
This captures hazards at system level, risk mitigation architecture at subsystem level and 
failure modes and effects analysis models at component level.  
Each AADL error model can be stored in a library and can be reused for different AADL 
components. Propagation of errors between components is determined by their 
interdependencies and the AADL Error Model Annex has defined a set of dependency rules 
(Feiler and Rugina, 2007) to define interdependencies between components. For example, 
propagations may occur from a component to any outgoing connections and between all sub-
components of the same process which is conceptually similar to Papadopoulos’s dual 
approach to propagations in his integration of HiP-HOPS and Matlab Simulink models 
(Papadopoulos & Maruhn, 2001).  
One limitation of the language lies in the incomplete support, at least in its core concepts, of 
analysis of the runtime architectures. This is compensated by extensions to accommodate 
analysis specific notations that can be associated with components. Error modelling for 
instance is supported through an annex that has been added to the standard. AADL error 
models can be analyzed through an automated translation into a standard fault tree (Joshi, 
Vestal, & Binns, 2007), or by generating Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs) from 
error model specifications and using a GSPN tool for quantitative analysis (Rugina, Kanoun, 
& Kaaniche, 2007).  
2.7 System Dynamics and Temporal Considerations 
A number of techniques have been developed to address the temporal and dynamic limitation 
of classical FTA and FMEA. The Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) (Dugan, Bavuso, & Boyd, 
1992) approach introduced new gates and temporal notions to account for ordered events and 
handle probabilistic timed behaviour in fault trees. Some techniques which are based on 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) (Rao et al., 2009)  offer alternatives by modelling temporal 
failure and repair through state-time diagrams. Dynamic Reliability Block Diagram (DRBD) 
(Distefano & Puliafito, 2007) model component failures and repairs based on their 
dependencies using state machines, while coloured Petri Nets have been used to analyzed 
DRBD in (Robidoux, Lu, Xing, & Zhou, 2010). Other researchers like (Hura & Atwood, 
1988), and Helmer et al. (2007) have used Petri Nets to solve classical fault trees. The 
combination of state and event based formalisms has been adopted in Boolean Logic Driven 
Markov Processes (Bouissou, 2007) and State-Event Fault Trees (SEFT). The temporal 
extension to HiP-HOPS which is implemented through Pandora also aims to address temporal 
dynamics.  
3 Behavioural Fault Simulation 
In Behavioural Fault Simulation, system failure models are produced by injecting faults into 
executable formal specifications of a system, thereby establishing the system level effects of 
faults. This fault injection technique was developed in the ESACS (Bozzano et al, 2003) and 
ISAAC (Akerlund et al. 2006) projects. As opposed to the dedicated analysis model 
commonly used in FLSA, Behavioural Fault Simulation uses an extended model which is 
automatically constructed from a system design model. The extended model typically 
contains both the nominal input flow as well an input related to the fault, which is taken into 
consideration when activated. System behaviour is observed when faults are activated. The 
fundamental analysis of this approach is similar to the exhaustive search through activation of 
all possible combinations of failures.  
Model checking is often used to verify the system safety properties in the extended model. 
Model checking performs exhaustive exploration to check whether a safety property – which 
is usually expressed in temporal logic – holds. The tool produces counterexample when 
safety properties do not hold to show traces of simulation on how the breaching condition is 
reached.   
3.1 Formal Safety Analysis Platform - New Symbolic Model Verifier  
The Formal Safety Analysis Platform - New Symbolic Model Verifier (FSAP/NuSMV-SA) 
(Bozzano & Villafiorita, 2003) consists of a set of tools including a graphical user interface 
tool, FSAP, and an extension of  model checking engine NuSMV. The aim of this platform is 
to support formal analysis and safety assessment of complex systems and allows failure 
injection into the system. The effects of that failure on the system behaviour are then 
observed.  
The FSAP/NuSMV-SA platform has different modules to perform different tasks. The central 
module of the platform is the SAT Manager which control the other modules of the platform. 
It stores all the information related to safety assessment and verification which includes the 
extended system model, failure modes, safety requirements and analyses. System models are 
described as finite state machines using the NuSMV language as plain text. A model can be a 
formal safety model or a functional system model and the user has the flexibility to use their 
preferred text editor to design or edit the system model. The Failure Mode Editor and Fault 
Injector modules allow the user to inject failure modes in the system model to create an 
extended system model. The expressions of the failure modes can be stored in a library to 
provide greater degree of reusability. The system model is then augmented with safety 
requirements in the Safety Requirement Editor. Temporal logic is used to express the safety 
requirements and can also be stored in a library to facilitate future reuse. The Analysis Task 
Manager defines the analysis tasks that are required to be performed, i.e. specification of the 
analyses. The next step is to assess the annotated system model against its functional safety 
requirements.  This task is done based on the model checking capability incorporated in the 
NuSMV-SA Model Checker module. This module also generates counter examples and 
safety analysis results by means of fault trees.  The Result Extraction and Displayer modules 
process all the results generated by the platform and present to the user. The fault trees can be 
viewed in the Displayer that is embedded in the platform or using commercial tools, and 
counter examples can be viewed in textual or graphical or tabular fashion.       
Although the FSAP/NuSMV-SA platform provides multiple functionalities; it does also have 
some limitations, especially in handling fault trees. Fault trees generated by this toolset show 
the relation between top events and basic events. However fault trees are flat and don't show 
propagation of failure which could make the fault trees for complex systems unintuitive. The 
tool enables qualitative FTA, but it does not have the ability to perform probabilistic 
evaluation of FTs. Like other model checking based approaches, this platform also suffers 
from state space explosion while modelling large or complex systems.  
3.2 AltaRica 
AltaRica (Point & Rauzy, 1999) is a description language designed to be able to formally 
describe complex systems. AltarRica allows systems to be represented as hierarchies of 
components and subcomponents and models both events and states. Unlike FSAP/NuSMV, 
AltaRica uses dedicated safety models. AltaRica models can be analysed by external tools 
and methods, e.g. for the generation and analysis of fault trees, Petri nets, and model-
checking (Bieber, Castel, & Seguin, 2002). 
In AltaRica, components are represented as nodes, and each node possesses a number of 
states and variables (either state variables or flow variables). The values of the state variables 
are local to the node they are in, and change when an event occur, i.e. events are triggering 
state transitions, thus changing the values of state variables. Flow variables are visible both 
locally and globally and are used to provide an interface to other nodes in the model.    
Each basic component is described by an interfaces transition system, containing the 
description of the possible events, possible observations, possible configurations, mappings 
of what observations are linked to which configurations, and what transitions are possible for 
each configuration. A small example of AltaRica node is shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 Small Example of AltaRica Node 
The behaviour of a component (node) is defined through assertions and transitions. 
Assertions specify restrictions over the values of flow and state variables whereas transitions 
determine causal relations between state variables and events, consisting of a single trigger 
(event) and a guard that constraints the transition; guards are assertions over flow and state 
variables. In the example, the node 'block' contains three flow variables (O, I, A) and one 
state variable (S). There is one event, failure, that causes the state to transition to false. The 
assertion links the flow variables such that output only occurs when input is present, an active 
signal is present, and the component is functioning (i.e. S = true, which is the initial state). 
After defining the nodes, these can be organized hierarchically to reflect system 
decomposition and architecture. The top-level node represents the system itself, and it 
consists of other lower-level nodes. Nodes can communicate either through interfaces or 
though event dependencies. The first process is done by specifying assertions over interfaces 
and the second one is done by defining a set of broadcast synchronisation vectors. These  
broadcast  synchronisation  vectors  allow  events  in  one  node  or  component  to  be 
synchronised with those in another node. Vectors can contain question marks to indicate that 
an event is not obligatory (e.g. a bulb cannot turn off in response to a power cut if it is already 
off). Additional  constraints  can  be  applied  to  the  vectors  to  indicate  that  certain  
combinations  or numbers of events must occur, particularly in the case of these 'optional' 
events, e.g. that at least one of a number of optional events must occur, or that k-out-of-n 
must occur.  
Two main variants of AltaRica have been designed so far. The primary difference between 
the variants is how the variables are updated after firing of transitions. In the original 
AltaRica (Arnold, Point, Griffault, & Rauzy, 2000) , variables are updated by solving 
constraints, and thus consume too much computational resource. Therefore, this approach is 
not scalable for industrial application although it is very powerful.  To make AltaRica 
capable of assessing industrial scale applications, AltaRica Data-Flow (Boiteau, Dutuit, 
Rauzy, & Signoret, 2006) is introduced where variables are updated by propagating values in 
a fixed order, and the order is determined at compile time. This approach takes fewer 
resources, however, it cannot naturally model bidirectional flows through a network, cannot 
capture located synchronisation, and faces difficulties in modelling looped systems. Recent 
work on AltaRica 3.0 (Batteux, Prosvirnova, Rauzy, & Kloul, 2013) is under specification. It 
improves the expressive power of the second version without reducing the efficiency of 
assessment algorithms. The main improvement is: it defines the system model as a new 
formalism - that of Guarded Transition Systems (GTS) - which allows modelling systems 
with loops, and can easily model bidirectional flows. AltaRica 3.0 provides a set of 
assessment tools, e.g.  a Fault Tree generator, a Markov chain generator, and stochastic and 
stepwise simulators.  
3.3 Safety Analysis Modelling Language 
The Safety Analysis Modelling Language (SAML) (Güdemann & Ortmeier, 2010) is a tool-
independent modelling framework that can be used to construct system models with both 
deterministic and probabilistic behaviour. It utilises finite state automata with parallel 
synchronous execution capability with discrete time steps to describe system models 
consisting of hardware, software components and environment inputs. In the state automata, 
transitions can be defined both as probabilistic and non-deterministic. From a single SAML 
model both qualitative and quantitative analysis can be performed.  
A SAML model consists of at least one module description and declarations of zero or more 
constants and formulas. Figure 5 shows an example of SAML model.  
 
Figure 5 Example of SAML Model 
This example has two modules (A and B), four constants, and one formula. The modules are 
declared as state automata, so every module has at least one state variable and at least one 
rule to update the state variable. Every state variable is represented as a range of integer 
values and initialised with a value. Every update rule defines either at least a probabilistic 
assignment or at least one non-deterministic choice of assignments, and they are conditioned 
on a Boolean activation condition.  
SAML models can be transformed automatically to the input format of other model-based 
safety analysis techniques. Therefore SAML can work as an intermediate language for 
MBDA techniques, i.e. if models designed in any other higher-level language can be 
converted to SAML models (extended system models) then the resultant models can be 
transformed to input format of other targeted analysis tools, and, thereby analysed with 
different targeted tools.  
Güdemann & Ortmeier (2011) have shown ways of transforming SAML model into the input 
language of probabilistic model checker PRISM (Kwiatkowska, Norman, & Parker, 2011). In 
the same work, the above researchers have also shown ways of transforming SAML modules 
to NuSMV although the former supports both non-deterministic and probabilistic update 
rules whereas the later one supports only non-deterministic update rules.   
In addition to being a high-level modelling and specification language, SAML can also be 
used as an intermediate language. Its formal qualitative and quantitative semantics allows 
different analyses to be performed in the same model.  
3.4 Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis  
Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis or DCCA (Ortmeier, Reif, & Schellhorn, 2005) is a 
formal method for safety analysis which uses mathematical methods to determine whether a 
given component fault is the cause of a system failure. It is a formal generalization of FMEA 
and FTA, but it is more formal than FTA and more expressive than FMEA. DCCA represents 
the system model as finite state automata with temporal semantics using Computational Tree 
Logic (CTL). It assumes that all the basic component failure modes are available, and then 
defines a set of temporal properties that indicate whether a certain combination of component 
failure modes can lead to system failure. This property is known as criticality of a set of 
failure modes which are analogous to cut sets of classical fault trees. Similar to FTA, DCCA 
aims at determining the minimal critical sets of failure modes which are necessary and 
sufficient to cause the top event (system failure).  
DCCA also faces state explosion problem because to determine minimal critical sets it has to 
consider all possible combinations of component failure modes. This problem can be 
alleviated to some extent by using results from other informal safety analysis techniques like 
FTA which are believed to be generating smaller but good initial guesses for solutions. 
However, by doing this, DCCA also inherits the shortcomings of FTA, i.e. inability of  
capturing dynamic behaviour where order of events is important. Deductive Failure Order 
Analysis (Güdemann, Ortmeier, & Reif, 2008) is a recent extension which enables DCCA to 
deduce temporal ordering information in critical sets. In this extension, Pandora style 
temporal gates like PAND and SAND are used to capture temporal behaviour. Temporal 
logic laws are also provided to make the temporal ordering deduction process automated.  
4 Towards Integrated Approaches 
This section explores the strengths and limitations often shared by different techniques within 
the FLSA and BFS fields. There has been a paradigm shift in recent years where research 
work and efforts have been channelled into extending and integrating different techniques to 
address identified limitations.   
4.1 Applicability and Challenges of FLSA  
FLSA techniques generally use a dedicated model developed for the purpose of the analysis 
(or annotations that augment the design model), which makes it easier to analyse the effect of 
failures on the system. This allows safety engineers to modify level of details avoiding 
unnecessary complexity while ensuring that the model is sufficient for dependability analysis 
purposes. Unintentional interactions (e.g. short circuits of electrical systems) can also be 
taken into consideration.  
The true benefits of this type of approach are most apparent when used as part of an iterative 
design process. As the failure behaviour of the system components is modelled in a 
compositional fashion, it is easier to determine the effects of design changes. This is 
particularly true for automated or partly automated techniques, which speed up the analysis 
process and make it possible to rapidly evaluate speculative changes to the design. This 
efficient nature of FLSA also means that valuable analysis can be started early in the design 
process when concrete system details are still scarce. FLSA produces safety artefacts which 
are familiar to safety engineers (e.g. FTA and FMEA).  
However, dedicated models also mean that additional effort is required to create these new 
models or extend any normal system model with the required information, and further effort 
may be required to harmonise these disparate models. This may also hamper the traceability 
between design and analysis models. 
Another limitation of FLSA is the lack of support for formal verification. FLSA are also  
fundamentally  static analyses, which do not take into consideration the changes in system 
states and are therefore limited in their ability to capture dynamic behaviour (although this 
limitation is, to a certain extent, addressed by some extended techniques as previously 
mentioned). 
4.2 Applicability and Challenges of BFS 
The strength of BFS lies in its ability to facilitate automated formal verification and capture 
the system dynamic behaviours. It is also possible to distinguish between transient and 
permanent failures and model the temporal ordering of failures. However, the fault simulation 
techniques have a number of limitations. The valuable safety artefacts such as fault trees 
(which are obtained through model checking) tend to have a ‘flat structure’, representing 
disjunction of all minimal cut-sets. This may hamper the understanding of the fault trees. 
Model-checking based techniques are computationally expensive, inductive in nature, and 
therefore suffer from state-space explosion problems. The exhaustive assessment of the 
effects of combinations of component failures is not feasible in large systems.  
Fault injection is also typically applied to executable design models, which are typically 
produced at a later development process stage when design changes are costly to implement. 
The analysis results therefore often lose the opportunity to drive the design process itself. 
While the construction of the extended model supports the consistency of the safety analysis, 
it may impose constraints on the safety analysis as explained in (Lisagor, Kelly, & Niu, 
2011). Extended models are inadequate in covering failures resulting from unintentional 
interactions or unintended dependencies between seemingly unrelated components. The 
techniques also rely on the set of predefined failure modes to be injected, and therefore the 
completeness of the analysis depends on the completeness of the failure list, which is difficult 
to guarantee.  
4.3 Towards Integrated Approaches 
As MBDA techniques develop and mature, various extensions are introduced to address the 
limitations identified. One of the increasing trends in integrated approaches is that between 
Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) and FLSA techniques. FLSA techniques aim to 
overcome the problems associated with a ‘pure’ dedicated model by automatically or semi-
automatically constructing the dependability analysis model (by partially utilizing the 
architecture of the design model). Translations from high-level ADLs to FLSA techniques 
allow tighter integration between the design and analysis process, and therefore a better 
traceability between design and analysis models. Recent work on FPTC in (Paige, Rose, Ge, 
Kolovos, & Brooke, 2008) uses a metamodel to support model transformations from SysML 
and AADL models. Metamodels have also been developed in (Adler, et al., 2011) to obtain 
CFT models from architectural models specified in UML. HiP-HOPS has been integrated 
with Matlab Simulink and Simulation X for many years (Papadopoulos & Maruhn, 2001). 
Recent integration work between HiP-HOPS and EAST-ADL is discussed in (Chen, 
Mahmud, Walker, Feng, Lonn, & Papadopoulos, 2013) and (Sharvia S. , Papadopoulos, 
Walker, Chen, & Lonn, 2014), and model transformation between HiP-HOPS and AADL is 
presented in (Mian, Bottaci, Papadopoulos, Sharvia, & Mahmud, 2014).  
Another trend on integration aims to enable the verification capabilities in FLSA. A number 
of integrated approaches have emerged where compositional FLSA techniques are merged  
with fault injection approaches. In this integrated approach, system structure and behaviour 
(nominal and failure) is expressed using a compositional model of architecture, and model 
transformation is performed to obtain a model which can be formally verified (verification 
model). The transformation can be carried out through direct transformation rules, or through 
an intermediate transformation where the intermediate model is used to achieve consistency 
and traceability between different design, analysis and verification approaches. The outline of 
this structure is illustrated in Figure 6. With the use of the intermediate transformation, high 
level models can be reused for different target approaches. Counter examples which are 
obtained from fault injection techniques can also be transformed back into dependability 
analysis models, for example as minimal cut-sets of fault trees. Failure Propagation and 
Transformation Analysis (FPTA) (Ge, Paige, & McDermid, 2009) links FPTC architectural 
models with probabilistic model checkers specified in PRISM. This enables FPTC to capture 
non-deterministic failure behaviour, and perform verification. Combined application between 
HiP-HOPS and NuSMV is described in (Sharvia & Papadopoulos, 2011). This work 
describes how dependability analysis results from HiP-HOPS can be used to systematically 
guide the construction of verification models specified in NuSMV, allowing early verification 
of functional behaviour and formulation of system degradation states.   
 
Figure 6 Model-based Integrated Approach (Aizpurua & Muxika, 2013) 
Integration through direct transformation is used in COMPASS project (COMPASS, 2013) 
which utilizes the System Level Integrated Modelling (SLIM) language (Bozzano, Cimatti, 
Katoen, Nguyen, & Noll, 2011). SLIM semantics covers nominal and error behaviour of 
AADL, and contains an extended model which allows verification via model checking. 
SAML is an example of an integrative approach via intermediate transformation. This is 
illustrated in Figure 7. A specification can be written in high-level CASE tool like SCADE or 
Matlab Simulink, transformed into a SAML model, and verified using NuSMV or PRISM. 
However, work on this is still in progress and there are transformation-related issues which 
need to be addressed (for example, implementation of high level to intermediate level model 
transformation). Another example is the Topcased project (TOPCASED, 2013) which 
transforms SysML, UML and AADL models into an intermediate model specified in 
FIACRE language (Berthomieu, et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 7 SAML as an Intermediate Language (Güdemann, Lipaczewski, Struck, & Ortmeier, 
2012) 
Challenges in these integrated approaches include the state-space explosion problem due to 
the size of verification model. There is also need to find an efficient way to feed the analysis 
results into the design model in order to maintain consistency, and a need to construct a user 
friendly toolset due to the range of models and analyses. 
The following table summarizes the approaches discussed in this paper:  
Technique  Features Limitations  Tool Support Extension/ 
Integrated Work   
FPTN Formal notation for 
system behavior; 
Temporal extension 
Lack of full 
automation  
SSAP toolset  N/A 




of all potential failure 
modes of interest 
Epsilon AADL, SysML, 
PRISM  
CFT Associations between 
fault and architectural 
hierarchies 
Lack of dynamic 
behavioral analysis 
ESSaRel tool  UML  
SEFT Capture system dynamic 
behavior  
Conversion to state-






HiP-HOPS  Automated dependability 
analysis; Temporal 
extension; Multi-
objective optimization  
Lack of  mature 
dynamic behavioral 
analysis  
HiP-HOPS tool  EAST-ADL, 
AADL, Simulink, 
Simulation X,  
NuSMV 
FSAP/NuSMV Formal verification; 
Library of failure modes 




AltaRica Formal verification; 
Timed automata and 
GTS extension 
State-explosion AltaRica tools AADL 
SAML  Captures deterministic 
and probabilistic 
behavior  




 tools  NuSMV, ADL 
(ongoing)  
SLIM  Integrated formal 
verification and 
dependability analysis 








4.4 Conclusions and Future Outlook  
Various MBDA techniques have been developed over the past 20 years, and these techniques 
tend to gravitates towards two different paradigms. This paper discussed the characteristics of 
both paradigms, and reviewed a number of prominent techniques, exploring their working 
mechanism, strengths, limitations and recent developments. These techniques have also 
evolved with recent extensions and integrations (as discussed in section 4.3) and utilize 
different strengths to address various challenges outlined earlier. In line with the increasing 
adoption of ADLs which encapsulate both architectural and behavioural information of the 
system, recent work has seen a number of model transformations between pioneering MBDA 
techniques and ADL models to enable greater analysis capabilities and consistency between 
design and analysis. This addresses the challenges arising from the use of dedicated model 
and improves the traceability between design and analysis models. Other types of integration 
aim to extend the analysis capabilities of the MBDA technique itself, particularly to enable 
verification in conjunction with dependability analyses. With the increasing popularity of 
model-driven engineering, metamodels for techniques have also been constructed to assist 
automation of code generations and model transformations.  
Future trends are likely to yield more robust integrations between existing paradigms and 
techniques. Efforts should also be placed into exploring ways to utilize different strengths in 
a complementary manner. The dependability community will also benefit from integrated 
automated tools to support adoptions of various techniques with minimum overhead caused 
by disjoint and dysfunctional tool chains. Separation concerns for hardware and software 
within design of complex embedded systems have, to a certain extent, been supported 
through the integration of analysis techniques with ADLs. Concerns still exist about 
traceability between models and analysis and focus should be given to feeding analyses 
effectively back to the design. The state-space explosion problem, which is inherently part of 
state-based techniques, can be addressed with abstraction techniques (although this is a 
largely complex subject in itself).  
Advanced capabilities to support the development and design decision of safety-critical 
systems are also important, particularly in a modern competitive engineering environment. 
The design of dependable systems must often address both cost and dependability concerns. 
The availability of different component alternatives and architectural configurations means 
that the task to find optimal or near optimal solutions is not a trivial one. It is also possible 
that no architectural configuration is able to meet all design requirements. In this case, the 
optimal trade-offs between dependability and cost need to be established. This opens the field 
to multi-objective optimization. MBDA techniques like HiP-HOPS have been extended with 
multi-objective optimization capabilities to assist design decisions (Adachi, Papadopoulos, 
Sharvia, Parker, & Tohdo, 2011); and Eclipse-based tool, ArcheOpterix, allows evaluation 
techniques and optimization heuristics for AADL specifications (Aleti, Bjornander, Grunske, 
& Meedeniya, 2009). Other works which look into the use of reconfigurable architectures for 
fault tolerant design and recovery strategies are discussed in (Aizpurua & Muxika, 2013) and 
(Papadopoulos, et al., 2011). There is also opportunity for model-based allocation of 
dependability requirements to be used as a tool for driving design refinement itself. This topic 
is for example studied in recent works within HiP-HOPS (Azevedo, Parker, Walker, 
Papadopoulos, & Araujo, 2013) where the automated allocation of safety requirements in the 
form of Safety Integrity Levels is investigated.   
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